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INTRODUCTION

It
could
have
been
the
case
that
declared
"most
of
Government... unconstitutional," by reviving a robust application of the doctrine
that prohibits Congress from delegating its law-making power to the other
branches.' At least that is what many awaiting the Court's widely-anticipated 2019
decision in Gundy v. United States believed, after the Court agreed to hear Gundy's
claim that "Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative power when it
authorized the Attorney General to 'specify the applicability' of [the federal Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act]'s registration requirements to pre-Act
offenders." 2 This includes, no doubt, the editors of this journal, when they chose
Gundy (before the decision) as the subject of the yearly "Term Paper" on a
significant Supreme Court case.
In the end, Gundy said little new about the nondelegation doctrine. This essay
follows the Court's lead and says little about nondelegation. Instead, it considers
another, equally significant aspect of the interpretation of sex offender registration
acts (SORAs): whether they, and other similar laws and regulations that purport to
be civil nonpunitive approaches to regulating behavior and protecting the public,
instead actually impose punishment and should be characterized as criminal rather
than civil. This characterization is significant, because a number of constitutional
protections-including the right to counsel, to a jury trial where the burden of proof
is beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the privilege against self-incrimination-are
mandated in criminal cases.3 Thus, while many consequences related to criminal
convictions might appear and feel quite punitive in nature, this essay focuses on the
more binary (although, as explored below, not neatly divided) doctrinal
.
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Gundy v. United States, No. 17-6086, slip op. at 17 (U.S. June 20,2019). The nondelegation

doctrine derives from Article I, §1 of the Constitution, which provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers

herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States," U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1, and "is rooted
in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government." Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
2

Gundy, slip op. at 4.

3

U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372

U.S. 335 (1963).
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determination that a particular consequence is a criminal punishment rather than a
civil consequence. 4 In addition to SORAs, there are a large and growing number of
so-called collateral consequences of criminal convictions. These include quite
drastic consequences, such as deportation, loss of public housing and financial aid,
and barriers to occupational licensing and employment, that often overshadow any
direct sanction imposed in the criminal case.5 Although some of these consequences
are directly based on or closely linked to an underlying criminal conviction, courts
have frequently characterized them as nonpunitive and thus civil under existing
doctrinal tests.6
But things are starting to change. There is recent research about whether
particular consequences actually advance-or instead undercut--the purportedly
nonpunitive public safety rationales upon which so many of them rest. There are
also advances in technology and the delivery of information about criminal records
that render an individual's experience of the "collateral" consequences of a criminal
conviction altogether different, and harsher, than previously. Drawing on these and
other changing realities, some courts have recently placed more consequences on
the criminal side of the line.7
Although reassessment of the civil-criminal line is already happening in the
lower courts, this issue could also resurface in a future nondelegation case-and
nondelegation is something the Supreme Court may well revisit soon. Thus, a brief
word on Gundy and then on its connection to the civil-criminal line. In Gundy, the
four-Justice plurality took a somewhat tortured view of the meaning of Congress'
words in the federal SORNA section that delegated "the authority to specify the
applicability of the requirements of this subchapter [of SORNA] to sex offenders
convicted before the enactment of this chapter"to the Attorney General.' Finding
that the law's "text, considered alongside its context, purpose, and history," gave the
Attorney General discretion to determine only how and when (but not whether) it
would be feasible to apply SORNA to those convicted before the act was effective,
the plurality held that Congress also provided appropriate guidance for the exercise
of that discretion and thus did not violate the nondelegation doctrine. 9 The Gundy
plurality did not disturb nondelegation doctrine as set out in cases from the 1930s.
4 This essay uses the terms civil-criminal and nonpunitive-punitive interchangeably, and in
reference to the doctrinal line that separates civil nonpunitive consequences from criminal punitive

ones (while recognizing that many purportedly nonpunitive consequences look and feel punitive). The
distinction between collateral and direct consequences is another relevant doctrinal line, similar to the
civil-criminal line.
5

See infra notes 34-35, and accompanying text.

6

See infra notes 26-33.

7

See infra Parts II, 1Il.

8

34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (2006).

9

Gundy, slip op. at 6.
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Herman Gundy lost and "most of Government" survived, with only eight Justices
taking part in the decision and a reluctant concurrence by Justice Alito. 10 However,
a full Court may soon return to the issue of nondelegation given Justice Alito's open
invitation to do so in his Gundy concurrence and a widely-predicted fifth vote from
Justice Kavanaugh to reconsider the current approach."
Should that happen, one choice the Court may confront is whether it should
treat delegation in the criminal law context differently from delegation in the civil
law context. This picks up on a suggestion in Justice Gorsuch's dissent in United
States v. Nichols, written shortly before he joined the Supreme Court, that courts
might use a particular-and particularly demanding-nondelegation test "when the
criminal law is involved."' 2 Although it is far from clear how and when the Court
might approach a future nondelegation case, a rule specific to criminal laws makes
good sense, as Wayne Logan has suggested in another term paper in this volume and
in prior writings, given the liberty interests involved and relative lack of technical
complexities in criminal law.' As Logan also notes, such an approach might force
the Court to address long-standing and challenging issues about the line between
civil and criminal sanctions. 14
That brings things back to this essay saying little about nondelegation. Separate
and apart from a delegation doctrine specific to criminal law, today-or in the near
future-how might the Court distinguish between a civil (nonpunitive) and criminal
(punitive) statute or regulation? Although the Court has answered that question
before, it has done so in different ways and varying contexts. There is reason to
expect that the Court might approach things differently (more coherently?) yet again.
In addition to much-needed clarity in the "conceptually muddled" body of doctrine
about the line between punitive and nonpunitive consequences that lower courts
grapple with in different contexts,1 5 reassessment of where consequences belong on
the civil-criminal line is particularly timely. A rapidly increasing number and
10

Gundy, slip op. at 1 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[B]ecause a majority is not willing to [reconsider

its approach to the nondelegation doctrine], it would be freakish to single out the provision at issue

here for special treatment.").
" Gundy, slip op. at 1 (Alito, J.,concurring) ("If a majority of this Court were willing to
reconsider the approach [to nondelegation] we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that
effort."); see also Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Supreme Court is One Vote Away from ChangingHow the
U.S. is Governed, THE NEW YORKER (July 3, 2019) https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-

columnists/the-supreme-court-is-one-vote-away-from-changing-how-the-us-is-govemed.
12 United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 672 (10th Cir. 2015).
"3 Wayne A. Logan, CriminalJustice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 OHIO
ST. J.CRIM. L. 51, 115 n.367 (2008).
14 Wayne A. Logan, Gundy v. United States: Gunningfor the Administrative State, 17 Ohio St.

J. Crim. L. 185 (2019).
15 Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil
ProceduralDivide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 781 (1997).
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variety of actors use criminal records in a broad range of decision-making functions,
sometimes mandated by state or federal law or regulation. That increase is
intertwined with easily-accessible public criminal records as well as a booming
background screening industry, putting such information just a few free, or relatively
inexpensive, keystrokes away for those actors.16
The remainder of this essay puts Gundy to the side and considers the line
between civil (nonpunitive) and criminal (punitive) consequences. Part I describes
how the civil-criminal divide arises in a number of important contexts, with a focus
on considerations set out in expostfacto doctrine. Part H discusses several Supreme
Court cases that hint at a growing recognition of shifting realities that might, in turn,
shift outcomes at the civil-criminal dividing line. Finally, Part III flags several of
the most significant changed realities and briefly discusses how courts might
integrate, and in some cases already have integrated, these new realities when
determining if a consequence is civil or criminal.
I. THE CURRENT DOCTRINAL LINE(S) BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
CONSEQUENCES

The division of consequences into "civil" and "criminal" categories, with an
array of constitutional protections applicable only on the criminal side of the divide,
suggests a firn binary. However, that dividing line is far from clear. As Carol
Steiker has observed, judicial attempts to "to identify 'punishment' so as to make
our two-track procedural system work... ha[ve] been conceptually muddled, to say
the least."17 The result is a patchwork of approaches that depends on the context of
the case. For example, in cases challenging various state and federal sex offender
registration and notification provisions, courts have considered the civil-criminal
line under the Ex Post Facto Clause 8 and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.19 Civil forfeiture has withstood challenge
20
and been deemed nonpunitive under the Double Jeopardy Clause. In a growing
body of caselaw related to consequences ranging from deportation to loss of pension
16

See infra notes 33-37, and accompanying text.

Steiker, supra note 15, at 781. Cf id. at 814 ("[T]he justifications for a criminal-civil divide
as I have construed them suggest that we should strive for a binary system rather than a middlegroundeven if that seems harsh (to either the state or the defendant) in borderline cases."); Joshua Kaiser, We
17

Know It When We See It: The Tenous Line Between "Direct Punishment" and "Collateral

Consequences, " 59 How. L.J. 341, 366 (2016) ("Padillav. Kentucky shattered any semblance of clarity
in the direct-collateral distinction, and lower courts are still reeling.").
"S See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370-71
(1997) (challenges by individuals convicted before the effective date of the relevant SORNA).
'9 Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1223 (D. Colo. 2017), appealfiled,No. 17-1333

(10th Cir. Sept. 21, 2017).
20 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 270-71 (1996).
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benefits, courts have confronted the civil-criminal divide in ruling on individuals'
claims that their lawyers' failure to advise them about that particular consequence
of their conviction or to plea bargain to avoid its imposition violated the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.2 ' Related cases examine judicial failure to advise a
defendant about a consequence of a guilty plea as a potential due process violation.2 2
These many doctrinal tests that courts employ to grapple with the line between
a civil and criminal consequence, as well as the robust scholarly debate about how
to define "punishment,, 23 are beyond the scope of this brief essay. Suffice it to say
that, had the Gundy Court fashioned a specific test for criminal law delegation, it
likely would have used an Ex Post Facto Clause analysis to confront the threshold
determination of whether the federal SORNA consequence at issue in that case was
criminal (punitive) or rather civil (nonpunitive). 2 4 Although the Court has not
examined the federal SORNA for these purposes, it undertook such an analysis of
Alaska's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) in Smith v. Doe, and did so under
the Ex Post Facto Clause. Further, the considerations in that analysis are relevant to
other, non-Ex Post Facto Clause cases involving the civil-criminal line.2
21 See generally MARGARET

COLGATE LOVE,

JENNY ROBERTS

COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION: LAW POLICY

&

WAYNE

A. LOGAN,

& PRACTICE 251-306 (2018-19

ed.) (examining the scope of the Sixth Amendment obligations of counsel before and after Padilla);
see also Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea BargainingCounsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2656-68 (2013).
22

LOVE, ROBERTS

& LOGAN, supra note 21, at 299-304.

' See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 15, at 799 (describing the need to define "punishment" to
"explain what it is about the distinguishing features of punishment that calls for a special procedural
regime (whatever the contingent particulars of that regime may be)."); see also Brian M. Murray, Are
Collateral Consequences Deserved, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2019) (manuscript at
n.4). ("[iE]ven if collateral consequences are not criminalpunishment by classification, they can still
be punitive.").
24 In Gundy itself, this would not have been a difficult question, as Gundy was challenging his
conviction under a portion of the federal SORNA that allowed for a 10-year prison sentence for failure
to register. Gundy, slip op. at 4-5 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Although Justice Gorsuch did not focus on
a specific criminal nondelegation test in his Gundy dissent, he began that dissent by pointing out how
the SORNA delegation at issue "purports to endow the nation's chief prosecutor with the power to
write his own criminal code governing the lives of a half-million citizens" and how SORNA was a
"law[n restricting the liberty of this group[.]" Id. at I (describing SORNA as a "criminal code" three
times in dissenting).
25 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997) ("Our conclusion that the [Sexually
Violent Predator] Act is nonpunitive thus removes an essential prerequisite for both Hendricks' double
jeopardy and ex post facto claims."); Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1226 (D. Colo. 2017),
appealfiled, No. 17-1333 (10 t Cir. Sept. 21, 2017) (applying seven factors from Supreme Court's ex
postfacto test for punitive "effect" in Eighth Amendment analysis); see also Steiker, supra note 15, at
819 ("Recall that Mendoza-Martinez, listed seven 'factors' as generally applicable to determinations
of whether putatively civil proceedings are really criminal for all purposes."); David Singleton, What
is Punishment?:The Casefor ConsideringPublic Opinion UnderMendoza-Martinez, 45 SETON HALL
L. REV. 435, 439 (2015) (stating that the Mendoza-Martinez,"framework has been used in a variety of
contexts to determine whether statutory sanctions impose punishment").
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In 2003 in Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court ruled that Alaska's SORA was "a
civil, nonpunitive regime. ' 26 As such, its application to individuals convicted before
27 To arrive at this
its effective date did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
conclusion, the Court applied a two-part test. First, courts must ask whether the
legislature intended the law to be punitive. 28 If so, it would be a criminal law that
could not be applied retroactively (and to which all other relevant procedures for
29
criminal cases would presumably apply, although those were not at issue in Smith).
If the legislature instead intended to "enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and
nonpunitive," courts must proceed to the second part of the test and ask whetherby the "clearest proof -"the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate the State's intention to deem it civil." 3 ° For this "in effect" prong,
courts can refer to the seven factors drawn from its earlier decision, Kennedy v.
3 1 These
Mendoza-Martinez, as non-exclusive and non-dispositive "guideposts."
3 2: "involves
factors ask whether, "in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme"
an affirmative disability or restraint"; "has historically been regarded as a
punishment"; "comes into play only on a finding of scienter"; operates to "promote
the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence"; applies to behavior
that "is already a crime"; is rationally connected to "an alternative purpose" other
than punishment; and "appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned." 33 In Smith, the Court found nonpunitive intent and nonpunitive effect.

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 96 (2002). There are two ex postfacto clauses in the Constitution.
U.S. CONST. ART. 1, §§ 9-10. Art. 1, § 9 prohibits Congress from passing any laws which apply expost
facto, while Art. 1 § 10 (the relevant provision in Smith) applies to state passage of any such laws. Id.
26

27

Smith, 538 U.S. at 105.

28

Id. at 92.

29

Id.

30 Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (internal quotations omitted). Cf Donald Dripps, The Exclusivity of

the CriminalLaw: Toward a "Regulatory Model" of or "PathologicalPerspective" on, the CivilCriminal Distinction, 7 J.CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 199, 211 (1996) (noting the danger of the
government attempting to circumvent procedural safeguards of the criminal process by
"rechristenfing] ... crimes as 'administrative violations"').
Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144 (1963)) (noting
how these seven factors "migrated into our ex postfacto case law from double jeopardy jurisprudence,
[and] have their earlier origins in cases under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, as well as the Bill of
Attainder and the Ex Post FactoClauses").
31

32

Id.

" Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963); see also Margo Schlanger,
The Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 CORNELL L. REv. 357, 387 (2018)
(describing Mendoza-Martinez as "the leading case explaining how judges should decide whether a
particular statutory consequence imposed on someone as a result of their conduct "is penal or [,
instead,] regulatory in character").
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Since the Court decided Smith, a lot has changed. This includes changes to
some jurisdiction's SORAs that renders them more punitive in effect than
previously, 34 but goes far beyond SORA provisions. There has been a steep uptick
in the number and scope of other so-called collateral consequences of criminal
convictions, in the form of a myriad of barriers to employment, housing, education,
occupational licensing, and harsh consequences relating to immigration and parental
rights, to name just some. 3' At the same time, technological advances have
contributed to the proliferation of data collection and sale, leading to "a bustling
economy that operates largely in the shadows, and often with few rules. 36 Many
data aggregators deal in criminal records, allowing public access to integrated,
nation-wide information that would have been largely inaccessible until quite
recently. State governments also maintain criminal record databases that are
publicly-accessible and free or cheap. 37 "Further, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and
ensuing security fears increased the demand for publicly available criminal
records., 38 These current avenues of and demand for information stand in stark
contrast to the recent past, when it was necessary to travel to the courthouse to view
that jurisdiction's public criminal records.39
The next Part describes the Supreme Court's growing awareness of these
shifting realities of the consequences that flow from a criminal conviction.

34

See, e.g., Does v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 701-05 (6 th Cir. 2016).

35 See LOVE, ROBERTS & LOGAN, supra note 21, at ch. 2; see also Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is
Effectively Bliss: CollateralConsequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process,
95 IOWA L. REv. 119, 120-21 (2009) ("[C]ourts categorize many other severe consequences as
collateral, including involuntary civil commitment, sex-offender registration, and loss of the right to
vote, to obtain professional licenses, and to receive public housing and benefits.").
36 Steven Melendez & Alex Pasternack, Here are the Data Brokers Quietly Buying and Selling
Your
Personal
Information,
FAST
COMPANY
(Mar.
2,
2019),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90310803/here-are-the-data-brokers-quietly-buying-and-selling-yourpersonal-information; see generally Jenny Roberts, ExpungingAmerica 'sRap Sheet in the Information
Age, 2015 WiS. L. REv. 321 (2015).
37 See, e.g., Maryland JudiciaryCase Search, MD. JUDICIARY, http://casesearch.courts.state.
md.us/inquiry/inquiry-index.jsp (last visited Aug. 17, 2019) (providing "public access to the case
records of the Maryland Judiciary").
31 Jeffrey Selbin, Justin McCrary, & Joshua Epstein, Unmarked? Criminal Record Clearing
and Employment Outcomes, 108 J. CRiM. L. & CRMNOLOGY 1, 9 (2017).

39 Of course, some of these realities did not stop Justice Kennedy, albeit writing more than
fifteen years ago, from describing public access to on-line SORA information as "more analogous to a
visit to an official archive of criminal records than it is to a scheme forcing an offender to appear in
public with some visible badge of past criminality." Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2002).
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II. HINTS OF A SHIFTING CIVIL-CRIMINAL LINE?

Although the Supreme Court has leaned heavily towards "civil" designations
when determining the nature of particular consequences,4" it has recently recognized
current realities that may shift which consequences fall on which side of the line.
Although not involving analyses under the Ex Post Facto Clause, these cases offer
hints of a shifting civil-criminal line that are relevant in a variety of contexts. Take,
for example, Padillav. Kentucky, a 2010 ineffective assistance of counsel case that
declined to determine whether deportation was a "direct" or "collateral"
consequence. Instead, the Court stated this was "a question we need not consider in
this case because of the unique nature of deportation."'" Despite this statement and
its recognition of earlier decisions that categorized immigration removal
proceedings as "civil in nature," the Court detailed how immigration law has become
increasingly harsh-with far more avenues to deportation and far fewer
opportunities for relief from deportation than in the recent past. The Court
characterized deportation as "a particularly severe 'penalty"' that is "intimately
related to the criminal process." 42 All of this made it "most difficult" for the Courtand notably "even more difficult" for noncitizen criminal defendants--Ao "divorce
43
the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context., For that reason, the
Court held that defense counsel must advise clients about the deportation
consequences of a conviction in order to meet minimum standards of competency
under the Sixth Amendment.'
Seven years later, Justice Roberts wrote for a 6-2 Court in Lee v. United States
and drew heavily on Padilla'scharacterization of deportation as "sometimes the
most important part... of thepenalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants
who plead guilty to specified crimes." 4 5 The Court found that Lee's conviction and

4

See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (holding that removal

proceedings are civil in nature); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366
(1984) (holding that federal statute providing forfeiture mechanism for firearms "is not an additional
penalty for the commission of a criminal act, but rather is a separate civil sanction, remedial in nature
[and thus]" is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause). Cf Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 448,
(2011) ("We... hold that the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of
counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent individual who is subject to a child support order,
even if that individual faces incarceration (for up to a year).").

41

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010).

42

Id. (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698).

"

Id. at 365-66 (quoting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038).

44Id. at 374.

45 Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2017) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364)
(emphasis added). For a description of another groups of cases where the Court has attempted to
straddle the civil-criminal divide, see Steiker, supra note 15, at 798-99 (discussing civil forfeiture and
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sentence should have been vacated because Lee showed that avoiding deportation
was his main priority and thus proved that he was prejudiced by his attorney's failure
to advise him that his guilty plea would lead to automatic deportation. 4 The
decision acknowledged the importance of how a defendant experiences severe
consequences of a conviction, separate and apart from any legislative (or judicial)
declaration of the civil or criminal nature of that consequence.
Or consider, in the same year as Lee, the Supreme Court's unanimous
invalidation of a North Carolina law that made it a felony for individuals subject to
sex offender registration "to access a commercial social networking Web
site... know[ing] that the site permits minor children to become members or to
create or maintain personal Web pages."4 7 Although a First Amendment analysis,
Packinghamv. North Carolinanoted the shifting civil-criminal divide. First, Justice
Kennedy stated:
While we now may be coming to the realization that the Cyber Age is a
revolution of historic proportions, we cannot appreciate yet its full
dimensions and vast potential to alter how we think, express our-selves,
and define who we want to be. The forces and directions of the Internet
are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts must be conscious
that what they say today might be obsolete tomorrow.4 8
While referring to revolution in the nature of places for the exchange of views, these
words are also relevant to the increasingly obsolete nature of the Court's
characterization of sex offender registration and some other consequences as civil
and nonpunitive "in effect." On this front, although "not an issue before the Court,"
Packinghamnoted "the troubling fact that the [North Carolina] law imposes severe
restrictions on persons who already have served their sentence and are no longer
subject to the supervision of the criminal justice system."4 9
Most recently, Justice Gorsuch concurred in Sessions v. Dimaya, a void-forvagueness challenge to a section of federal immigration law, and noted that:
[Tioday's civil laws regularly impose penalties far more severe than those
found in many criminal statutes[.] Ours is a world filled with more and
more civil laws bearing more and more extravagant punishments. Today's
"civil" penalties include confiscatory rather than compensatory fines,
fine cases where "the Supreme Court has concluded that some state actions may be 'punitive' only for
the purpose of invoking one or another procedural protection").
46

Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968-69.

"

Packingharn v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (2017).

48

Id. at 1736.

49

Id. at 1737.
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forfeiture provisions that allow homes to be taken, remedies that strip
persons of their professional licenses and livelihoods, and the power to
commit persons against their will indefinitely. Some of these penalties are
routinely imposed and are routinely graver than those associated with
crimes-and often harsher than the punishment for
misdemeanor
5°
felonies.
While the Supreme Court has only commented around the edges of the woefully
outdated civil-criminal line, a growing number of lower federal and state courts have
tackled the issue head-on, detailing shifting realities in declaring punitive
consequences that might have been previously categorized as civil. While these
changes are well-documented, 5 1 it is worth highlighting a few areas where courts
have started to recognize a substantive difference in the internet age about various
aspects of the human experience of punishment.5 2
111. CHANGING REALITIES AT THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL LINE
Even under existing doctrine governing the dividing line between laws that
impose civil versus criminal consequences, courts should categorize more of those
consequences as criminal given several current realities. First, a growing body of
empirical evidence sheds light on, and often undermines, the purportedly
nonpunitive public safety rationale that legislatures advance (and courts use) in
categorizing a law as civil and not criminal in intent and effect. Second, there are
major changes in the way people experience the various consequences related to a
criminal conviction, 53 due to the recent proliferation of these consequences
combined with technological developments that allow easy access to criminal
records. For instance, public interaction with on-line information acts as a shaming
mechanism that blurs the line between state and public imposition of punishment.
Third, a number of consequences-such as immigration, sex offender registration,
and loss of public, educational, and housing benefits-are now well-integrated into
the plea bargaining and sentencing phases of the criminal process.
50

concurring).
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 1229 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,

51 See, e.g., LOVE, ROBERTS, AND LOGAN, supra note 21, at Ch. 4 (discussing various decisions
finding right to counsel violations relating to a number of consequences, including immigration and
sex offender registration, previously categorized as "collateral"); Wayne A. Logan, Challenging the
Punitiveness of "New Generation" SORN Laws, 21 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 426 (2018).
52 It is certainly possible that this increased recognition of the blurred line between punishment
and a civil regulatory scheme (or between "direct" and "collateral" consequences) could make courts
more reluctant to find more consequences punitive or direct, as this would lead to the full array of
criminal procedural protections for those consequences.
" There are, of course, a number of consequences that can result from the mere fact of an arrest,
even without conviction. See Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 820-25 (2015).
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A. EmpiricalEvidence About Whether Laws Advance (orHurt)Public Safety
A central and recurring theme in cases analyzing whether a particular law or
regulation imposes punishment, and is thus criminal, is that advancing public safety
is "a legitimate nonpunitive purpose."54 Indeed, a "rational connection to a
nonpunitive purpose is a most significant factor in [the] determination that the
statute's effects are not punitive.""5 In Smith v. Doe, for example, the Court found
that "alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community" was a
legitimate nonpunitive purpose of public safety.56 Distinguishing between a public
safety purpose and a punitive purpose is, in itself, a complex definitional issue.57
But putting aside that larger question, and assuming that such a distinction can be
neatly made, what should courts do when there is no empirical evidence that the
legislature's purported public safety rationale for a particular scheme is, in fact,
making the public safer? Even more to the point, what if that evidence shows that
the scheme actually diminishes public safety?
These are not theoretical questions. Such empirical evidence now exists, and
courts have taken note. For example, in a significant recent case, Does v. Snyder,
the Sixth Circuit held that Michigan's SORA retroactively imposed punishment in
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 58 While the court documented significant
differences between the Michigan law and the federal SORNA that the Supreme
Court examined in Smith, it also called into question Smith's reliance on studies
finding recidivism rates of individuals convicted of sex offenses 'frightening and
high."' 5 9 Instead, Snyder cited a "study suggest[ing] that sex offenders (a category
that includes a great diversity of criminals, not just pedophiles) are actually less
likely to recidivate than other sorts of criminals."6 This related directly to the Smith
5'

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102-03 (2002).

"

Id. at 102 (internal quotation and citation omitted)

56

Id. at 103.

" See Murray, supra note 23, at n.16 (noting how "pursuing public safety is not exclusively a
regulatory goal" but instead "underlies the theory of incapacitation, which is a traditional purpose for
punishment... [and] might be considered a secondary effect of deterrence and rehabilitative theory").
Cf John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 675-76
(2012) ("In its early criminal-civil distinction cases, the Supreme Court seemed to assume that
everyone knew what the purpose of punishment was, and... [i]n some cases, the Court focused
on ... whether the sanction truly furthered the non-punitive purpose it purported to serve.").
58 Does v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705-06 (6th Cir. 2016).
'9 Id. at 704, (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 103).
60 Id. (citing LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS
RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (2003)). For a discussion of the problematic use of recidivism rates in

the SORA context, see Logan, supra note 51, at n.10; see also SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS: AN EMPIcAL EVALUATION (Wayne A. Logan & J.J. Prescott, eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2020).
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Court's finding that the "danger of recidivism... is consistent with the regulatory
objective" of the SORNA. 6 ' But the Snyder opinion did not stop there. It flagged,
as "[e]ven more troubling":
evidence in the record supporting a finding that offense-based registration
has, at best, no impact on recidivism. In fact, one statistical analysis in the
record concluded that laws such as SORA actually increase the risk of
recidivism, probably because they exacerbate risk factors for recidivism
by making it hard for registrants to62get and keep a job, find housing, and
reintegrate into their communities.
Perhaps most significantly, on the issue of empirical evidence about public safety,
Snyder noted "no evidence in the record" of "any positive effects" to counterbalance
the statute's "unclear" efficacy. 63 Further, "Michigan has never analyzed recidivism
The court also remarked that the
rates despite having the data to do so."'
in-person appearances 65before law
"frequent,
make
registrants
that
requirement
to public safety at all.",
relationship
no
have
to
appears
enforcement..,
The Snyder court's examination of the Michigan legislature's purported
purpose in passing and amending the SORA over the years under the harsh light of
the lack of evidence, countering proof, and even failure to analyze existing evidence
of public safety effects raises an interesting issue for other courts examining-and
litigants challenging or defending--other consequences that skate close to the civilcriminal line. What other empirical evidence exists, or could be developed, to test a
legislature's stated nonpunitive intent and the actual effect of the law?
For example, federal law disqualifies any student convicted of possession of a
controlled substance while enrolled in a higher education institution and receiving
any grant, loan, or work assistance from receiving federal financial aid for one year
Since the federal controlled substances schedule includes
for a first offense.'
67 a student convicted of possession of a small amount marijuana loses
marijuana,
federal aid absent proof of rehabilitation.68 In this example, at least two pieces of
61

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2002).

Snyder, 834 F.3d at 704-05 (citing J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex offender
Registrationand Notification Laws Affect CriminalBehavior?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 161 (2011)).
62

63

Id. at 705.

64 Id.
65

Id. (emphasis added).

66

20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1)(2015).

67

21 U.S.C. § 812 (2018).

20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(2)(A)-(B)(2015); 34 C.F.R. § 668.40(d)(2006) (specifying requirements
for approved drug treatment programs for proof of rehabilitation).
68
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empirical evidence might help determine if the effect of the law crossed over the
punitive line. First, there is well-developed evidence that black individuals are
almost four times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than white
individuals, despite long-standing public health studies showing similar rates of use
across all ages in both groups.69 Second, there is research "show[ing] that
education ... cuts the likelihood of returning to prison within three years by over 40
percent"; other research connects postsecondary education to labor market
success.7 ° Putting these two things together would support a claim (as part of the
"in effect" inquiry in an ex postfacto analysis, for example) that the disqualification
law advances a punitive-not public safety-purpose and is excessive with respect
to any nonpunitive purpose.
In an interesting development, some jurisdictions have declined to adopt certain
aspects of the strict standards set out in the federal SORNA in their state SORAs,
risking the loss often percent of their federal criminal justice funding.71 One of the
federal requirements is to include juveniles convicted of certain sex offenses on the
state registry for life.72 New York State rejected this requirement, in part because
such registration was not necessary for public safety. According to a state
spokesperson, "New York believes that our present laws and risk assessment method
provide our citizens with effective protection against sexual predators."73 Indeed,
research shows that children and teens adjudicated delinquent of sex offenses have
particularly low recidivism rates and that registration imposes significant harm that
includes barriers to education, employment, and housing, all of which potentially

69

AM. CIv. LrBERTES UNION, THE WAR ON MARUUANA IN BLACK AND WIoTE (June 2013),

https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field-document/ 114413-mj-report-rfs-rel I.pdf
70

U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., BEYOND THE Box: INCREASING ACCEss TO HIGHER EDUCATION FOR

JUSTICE-INVOLVED INDIVIDUALS 1 (2016) (citing Lois M. DAVIS ET AL., EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF CORRECTIONAL EDUCATION: A META-ANALYSIS OF PROGRAMS THAT PROVIDE EDUCATION TO
INCARCERATED ADULTS (Rand Corp. 2013), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research reports/RR266.html;
ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE, NICOLE SMITH & JEFF STROHL, RECOVERY: JOB GROWTH AND EDUCATION
REQUIREMENTS THROUGH 2020 (Geo. Pub. Pol'y Inst., Ctr. on Educ. & Workforce, 2013),

https://cew.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Recovery2020.FR

Web .pdf)).

34 U.S.C. § 20927(a)(2017) (setting forth 10 percent funding reduction for jurisdictions that
fail to substantially implement Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006
(federal SORNA)); 42 U.S.C. § 3751(a) (2017) (establishing Bryne JAG program). For details about
various jurisdictions' SORNA implementation status, see SORNA Implementation Status, OFF. SEX
71

OFFENDER SENT'G, MONITORING,

& TRACKING (last visited Aug. 22, 2019), https://smart.gov/soma-

map.htm.
34 U.S.C. § 20911 (2017) (including juveniles convicted of certain offenses); 34 U.S.C. §
20915 (2017) (setting out registration for the life of the offender "if the offender is a tier III sex
offender" with some possibility for reduction of time after 25 years).
72

71 Dylan Scott, States Find SORNA Non-Compliance Cheaper, GOVERNING (Nov. 7, 2011),
https://www.goveming.com/blogs/fedwatch/States-Find-SORNA-Non-Compliance-Cheaper.htm].
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increase recidivism rates.74 Given this research, there is a strong argument that
juvenile registration is effectively punitive.75 Since jurisdictions commonly offer
public safety as the nonpunitive rationale for their SORA, it seems that evidence of
harm to public safety for juvenile registration might offer the type of "clearest proof'
necessary to demonstrate that "the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose
or effect as to negate the State's intention to deem it civil."7 6
In the area of employment, a number of studies about the efficacy of criminal
record-based licensing restrictions may undercut legislative claims that such
restrictions are nonpunitive because they promote better and safer goods and
services. As a Department of Treasury report described,
A wide range of studies have examined the question of whether licensing
improves the quality of goods and services, as would be the case if
licensing successfully limited the practice of an occupation to high-quality
practitioners.... Overall, the empirical research does not find large
improvements in quality or health and safety from more stringent
licensing. In fact, in only two out of the 12 studies was greater licensing
associated with quality improvements.77
Finally, in a recent letter introducing its report on collateral consequences, the
United States Commission on Civil Rights stated that "[v]alid public safety bases
support some collateral consequences, such as limitations on working with children
for people convicted of particular dangerous crimes. Many collateral consequences,
however, are unrelated either to the underlying crime for which a person has been
convicted or to a public safety purpose." 78

Hum. RTS. WATCH, RAISED ON THE
default/files/reports/us05l3_ForUpload ! .pdf.
74

REGISTRY 1

(May 2013), https://www.hrw.org/sites/

Cf New Jersey ex rel. C.K., (A- 15-16) (077672) (N.J. 2018) (finding that New Jersey SORA
subsection setting out "irrebuttable presumption that juveniles... are irredeemable, even when they
no longer pose a public safety risk and are fully rehabilitated" is invalid because it "takes on a punitive
aspect that cannot be justified by [the New Jersey] Constitution").
71

76

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2002) (internal quotations omitted).

& DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK
16, 58 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
licensing report final nonembargo.pdf (listing 12 studies on licensing in areas including teaching,
dentistry, and building contracting); see also Stephen Slivinski, Turning Shackles Into Bootstraps: Why
OccupationalLicensing Reform Is the Missing Piece of CriminalJustice Reform, 2016-01 CTR. STUD.
ECON. LIBERTY ARIZ. ST. U. 2 (2016) ("This study estimates that between 1997 and 2007 the states with
the heaviest occupational licensing burdens saw an average increase in the three-year, new-crime
recidivism rate of over 9%.").
77
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Increasing concern about the effects of so-called collateral consequences of a
criminal record has driven increasing research in a variety of areas, including those
of registration, employment, and licensing discussed above. Whatever the ultimate
conclusion is with respect to a particular consequence, research has exposed the
fallacy of a number of claims that rely on a public safety rationale. With this
growing body of research, courts should apply increasing scrutiny to the purported
nonpunitive rationale of consequences based on a criminal conviction.
B. The Experience of andPublic Involvement in, Punishment
Technology has changed a lot of things about the criminal legal system.7 9 As
described above, ease of access to criminal records--combined with an
unprecedented rise in laws, regulations, and policies mandating or allowing use of
those records in decision-making processes-is a major consideration at the
increasingly blurred line between civil and criminal consequences.8 0 These changes
mean that individuals with criminal convictions experience more consequences than
ever before, despite believing their case is finished once they complete any jail or
prison time, probation, or other condition that the judge imposed at sentencing. In
short, the way individuals experience punishment is different, and harsher.
Technology has also led to more public involvement in inflicting consequences of a
conviction, in what appears to be a return to practices of public shaming that have
deep historical roots in punishment.8 1
Recall that in Packingham,the Supreme Court found it "troubling" that North
Carolina's law restricting internet use "imposes severe restrictions on persons who
already have served their sentence and are no longer subject to the supervision of
the criminal justice system." 2 One federal district courtjudge found Packingham's
"observation [about severe restrictions] significant" in its evaluation of Colorado's
SORA.83 While Millardv. Rankin is currently on appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the
trial court made several interesting observations in finding that Colorado's SORA
as applied to the three plaintiffs violated the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause as well as substantive due process protections.84 First,
threaded throughout the opinion is recognition-informed by testimony at hearings
" Perhaps the most prominent (and critiqued) example is how many jurisdictions now use
algorithms to help with bail determinations and other assessments of risk. For an excellent recent
article examining such assessments, see Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218
(2019).
80

See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.

81

Smith, 538 U.S. at 97-99.

82

Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).

83

Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1228 (D. Colo. 2017), appealfiled.

84 Id. at 1232.
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in the case-of the realities of the actual experience of sex offender registration, and
particularly notification, in the data age. For example, Millardnoted how "Justice
Kennedy's words [in Smith] ring hollow that the state's website does not provide the
public with means to shame the offender when considering the evidence in this
case." What Smith "did not foresee, [was] the development of private, commercial
websites exploiting the information made available to them .... The justices did not
85 Millard devoted significant
foresee the ubiquitous influence of social media."
attention to the public shaming aspects of Colorado's SORA, describing them as
different in kind from 2003 when the Supreme Court considered shaming in Smith
6 Second, Millard
and weighing them heavily on the scale of punitive effect.
detailed how "the plaintiffs have shown... [that] the public has been given,
commonly exercises, and has exercised against these plaintiffs the power to inflict
punishments beyond those imposed through the courts."87
Smith v. Doe reveals how the Supreme Court views the line between shaming
non-shaming consequences to be one of quantity as well as
(nonpunitive)
and
the Court noted how Alaska's SORA "Web site does not
example,
For
quality.
provide the public with means to shame the offender by, say, posting comments
underneath his record."88 Also noteworthy was that "[tihe Court of Appeals
identified only one incident from the 7-year history of Alaska's law where a sex
offender suffered community hostility and damage to his business after the
information he submitted to the registry became public."8 9 These findings stand in
stark contrast to the situation in Millard, some fourteen years later, under an
admittedly more expansive Colorado statute. Here, the court described non-party
witness testimony that "established that registered sex offenders and their families
and friends face a known, real, and serious threat of retaliation, violence, ostracism,
shaming, and other unfair and irrational treatment from the public, directly resulting
from their status as registered sex offenders, and regardless of any threat to public
safety." 90
Millard also introduced an interesting perspective relating to this shaming: "As
shown by the experience of these plaintiffs and the experience of others who have
testified, the effect of publication of the information required to be provided by
registration is to expose the registrants to punishments inflicted not by the state but
by theirfellow citizens."91 Other courts, including Smith, have "acknowledged that
85

Id. at

86

Id.

87

Id. at 1235.

88

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2002).

89

Id. at 100.

I

Millard,265 F. Supp. 3d at 1222-23.

1226.

91 Id. at 1226 (emphasis added).
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[on-line] notice of a criminal conviction subjects the offender to public shame, the
humiliation increasing in proportion to the extent of the publicity," but characterized
this as "attendant humiliation [that] is but a collateral consequences of a valid
regulation" that has public safety as its true purpose and effect.92
In Smith, Justice Kennedy also noted that historical shaming punishment
involved either "direct confrontation between the offender and the public" in "faceto-face shaming" or formal expulsion from the community. 93 Post-Smith courtsincluding the Supreme Court in Packingham-seemto have a better understanding
of the power of on-line dissemination of information, due to the central role it plays
in so many aspects of everyday life and the ways in which at least some members of
the public will make use of that information. Even where a legislature only intended
to supplement public safety by offering accurate information to the public,9 4 those
intentions are overtaken by current knowledge about vigilantism and other direct
confrontations of individuals on registries, or with other forms of widelydisseminated criminal history information. It is this current reality that should
inform the view of courts undertaking current analyses of consequences at the civilcriminal line.
A number of scholars have proposed ways that courts can better account for
individuals' actual experiences of particular consequences, either to determine if a
consequence is punitive or for some other doctrinal purpose. For example, David
Singleton has suggested that courts "consider public opinion regarding whether a
sanction is punitive" in undertaking the "in effect" prong of ex postfacto analyses. 95
Carol Steiker would have courts ask, in determining if a particular state action is
punishment and thus subject to procedural protections: "what is the effect of the
state's action on the individual?" and "what would the community understandthe
state's action to mean? ' 96 In a critique of the restrictive scope of protections for
prisoners under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment and Due Process Clauses, Margo Schlanger "argue[s] that constitutional
doctrine should ...center on the objective experience of incarcerated prisoners,
rather than the culpability of their keepers." 97

92

Smith, 538 U.S. at 99.

9' Id.at 98 (applying the Mendoza-Martinez factor that asks whether "the regulatory
scheme.. . has been regarded in our history and traditions as punishment").
94 See, e.g., id at 94 (describing how the Alaska legislature determined that "release of certain
information about sex offenders to public agencies and the general public will assist in protecting the
public safety").
9' Singleton, supra note 25, at 439; see also id. at 465-72 (describing study on public opinion
and punishment).
9

Steiker, supra note 15, at 811.

97 Schlanger, supra note 33, at 631.
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Current SORAs may offer the strongest case for reconsideration of prior
nonpunitive characterizations. The shaming aspects of SORAs set them apart from
many other consequences. Still, attention to how an individual experiences the
various consequences related to a criminal case are not unique to SORAs.
Mandatory barriers in occupational licensing can cause a person to lose their chosen
field of work. Mandatory deportation tears individuals from the only family and
country they know. Losing financial aid can end a person's educational experience,
with profound effects on future employment and financial prospects. Individuals
will often experience these consequences as punitive-often as more punitive than
any sentence imposed in the criminal case--even if courts have not characterized
them as such.
C. The Integration of "Collateral" Consequences into the Plea Bargaining and
SentencingPhases of the CriminalProcess
As discussed above, the Supreme Court held in Padillav. Kentucky that defense
attorneys have a Sixth Amendment duty to advise noncitizen criminal defendants
9
A spate of trainings and
about the deportation consequences of a conviction.
changes to office policies and practices followed this significant constitutional
As defense and prosecution knowledge of immigration
pronouncement. 0 0
consequences developed, plea bargaining to avoid harsh immigration consequences
became more common. 101
The Supreme Court has "long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain
2
is a critical phase of litigation demanding the effective assistance of counsel"" and
more recently that counsel who chooses to plea bargain must be effective in that

See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2017) ("Balanced against holding on
to some chance of avoiding deportation was a year or two more of prison time. Not everyone in Lee's
position would make the choice to reject the plea. But we cannot say it would be irrational to do so.").
98

9 See supranotes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussing Padillav. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356
(2010)).
1o See Jenny Roberts & Ronald F. Wright, Trainingfor Bargaining,57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1445, 1470 (2016).
101 Press Release, Off. of the St. Atty. for Baltimore City, States Attorney Marilyn Mosby
Instructs Her Office to Strongly Consider Prosecutorial Discretion for Cases Involving Immigrant
Defendants, Witnesses, and Victims (May 4, 2017), available at: http://tinyurl.com/yanatg4b. Some
offices and individual lawyers already integrated advisement about and advocacy around immigration,
as well as other "collateral" consequences, into their practice. However, this was concentrated in
certain jurisdictions and certainly became more widespread in the wake of Padilla.
102 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010).
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process.' 0 3 While the Court has not considered whether bargaining to avoid serious
collateral consequences is required under the Sixth Amendment, some state and
lower federal courts have found such a duty. 1" Further, the integration of collateral
consequences into plea bargaining is consistent with constitutional, ethical, and
professional standards. For example, professional standards recommend that defense
counsel bargain about collateral consequences that are significant to a client's
interests, since plea discussions may be a criminal defendant's first and only
opportunity to avoid these consequences. 0 5
There has also been significant movement toward integration of collateral
consequences at sentencing. Both the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice
Standards and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act would grant
courts the authority to relieve or dispense with applicable collateral consequences at
sentencing. 106 The recently-approved update to the Model Penal Code's Sentencing
provisions has a new Article devoted to collateral consequences. 107 With increased
attorney awareness of immigration and other serious consequences of convictions
comes increased advocacy around those consequences at sentencing.
The Court in Padilla based its decision, in part, on how "deportation
is... intimately related to the criminal process" and "[o]ur law has enmeshed
criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation."'' 08 The holding in the case led
to further enmeshment, in the form of mandated advisement about deportation prior
to a guilty plea and plea bargaining and sentencing that accounts for deportation. A
variety of other serious "collateral" consequences-including sex offender
103 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) ("During plea negotiations defendants are
'entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.'") (quoting McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S.
759, 771 (1970)).
104 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Marinho, 981 N.E.2d 648 (Mass. 2013) (relying
on state
constitutional grounds but citing Padilla,Frye, and Lafler in holding that counsel violated the first

prong of Strickland's ineffective assistance of counsel test when counsel failed to bargain for a
disposition that would avoid deportation consequences of a conviction).

'o'See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and Defense Function,
Standard 4-1.3 (4th ed. 2015) ("[A]t all stages of a criminal representation and on all decisions and
actions that arise in the course of performing the defense function," defense counsel has "a duty to
consider the collateral consequences of decisions and actions, including but not limited to the collateral
consequences of conviction").
106 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification
of Convicted Persons, Standard 19-2.5 (3d ed. 2004) (a sentencing judge should be authorized "to enter
an order waiving, modifying, or granting timely and effective relief from any collateral sanction
imposed by the law of that jurisdiction"); Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act § 10
(2010) (providing for sentencing court to issue an "Order of Limited Relief" from "one or more
collateral sanctions related to employment, education, housing, public benefits, or occupational
licensing.., at or before sentencing").
107 Model Penal Code: Sentencing (Am. Law Inst., Proposed Final Draft, 2017).
108

Padilla,559 U.S. at 366.

226

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol. 17:207

registration, loss of pension benefits, occupational licensing, and housing and
employment consequences-have become similarly well-integrated into the
This significant
criminal process (even if not by constitutional mandate).
divide.
civil-criminal
the
reconsider
development is yet another reason to
CONCLUSION
In the end, Gundy v. United States was a disappointment for those looking for
radical reconfiguration of the administrative state or even for a narrow decision
finding SORNA's broad delegation to the Attorney General crossed established
nondelegation doctrinal lines. But the Court is likely to revisit nondelegation and in
doing so might follow Justice Gorsuch's suggestion, from his time as ajudge on the
Tenth Circuit, of a criminal law nondelegation test. If that happens, difficult
determinations of what qualifies as "criminal" will surely follow. This term paper
took off from that point, leaving Gundy and nondelegation behind to consider issues
at the muddled line between civil and criminal, or punitive and nonpunitive,
consequences.
The Supreme Court has leaned heavily towards nonpunitive designations for
sanctions in a variety of contexts. However, changing realities have already led to
some different outcomes in the lower federal and state courts. These changes
include new and developing empirical evidence about the actual effects of various
laws and regulations, whatever their legislatively-declared purpose. They also
include a proliferation of so-called collateral consequences of criminal convictions
at a time when technological advances have allowed broad and easy access to
information about those convictions. Consequences previously categorized as
"civil" or "collateral" have also become integrated into the criminal process, mainly
at the plea bargaining and sentencing stages. Should the Court consider a criminal
nondelegation doctrine in a future case, threshold determinations of what qualifies
as "criminal" will be necessary. These new developments since the Court last
considered the civil-criminal line may, in the end, shift that line.

